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Abstract
The need for more effective ways to analyze network risks in real time has been recognized by
security planners. However, most existing risk analysis tools provide only methodological
analysis procedures, and cannot reflect continually changing vulnerability and threat
information concerning individual network systems in real time. For this reason, this study
suggests a new system design methodology which shows a scheme to collect and analyze data
from network intrusion detection systems and vulnerability analysis systems and estimates
risk levels. Through field tests, it was proven that the proposed system can provide log
analysis functions that help in reasoning out the behavior of an attacker. This paper includes
a design concept, the main algorithm and test results.
Keywords: Risk, Quantitative Analysis, Asset value, N-IDS, Vulnerability

1. Introduction
Today, most Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have and operate various methods to
effectively protect their assets, connected through networks, from all types of cyber attacks.
At this stage, risk analysis methodology[1-8], which utilizes information about elements of
vulnerability and threats to the network assets, is applied as a means to determine the
protection method and level.
In order to solve such problems, this study proposes a design plan for a system, which will be
able to conduct real-time based risk analysis by correlating the information supplied from
network assets value assessment, Network Intrusion Detection Systems (N-IDS) and
Venerability Analysis Systems (or VAS). This rest of this paper is organized as follows: In
chapter II, methods of estimating the value of the asset are explained. In chapter III, the
structure, functions and analysis algorithm of the proposed system are explained. In chapter
IV, the results of experiments of a network are described. Finally, conclusion and future
research directions are suggested

2. Asset Value Assessment Method
As a part of the network risk management process, risk analysis starts from identifying the
value (or importance) of the asset subject to protection by the security policy, and the
vulnerabilities and threats faced by the asset. The vulnerabilities and threats become direct
causes that generate risk and the asset value has the same meaning as the level of loss
induced by the risk. The existing risk analysis methodologies consider the risk as the
comprehensive attributes of asset, vulnerability and threat level and determine the risk level
by combining these factors.
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(Fig. 1) General ISP Network Model
However, categorizing assets, vulnerabilities and threat levels into only a few levels based on
attributes, is problematic. The decision for risk level classification tends to mainly rely on
subjective judgments. Also, when combining the asset value level, which is expressed in a
form of quantitative estimation value, and vulnerability and threat level, which are expressed
as step counts in descriptive form, the possible step counts increase and it becomes difficult
to incorporate the characteristics of the ISP subjected to the risk analysis. Therefore, there is
the problem of decreasing the objectivity of the results. Accordingly, the asset loss modeling
technique, recommended by Ho Kun Moon [10] is adopted in this study in order to solve the
above problem. Through this method, the asset value is expressed as a sum of service value
generated through the asset and the physical fixed asset value.
For example, a specific asset on network a k has a fixed asset value of V f (a k , x ) in x
year based on its purchasing point and if the generated service value in that year is V s (a k , x ) ,
the total asset value of a k , Vt (ak , x) in x year can be shown in the following formula (1).

Vt (ak , x) = V f (ak , x) + Vs (ak , x)

(1)

If the fixed amortization method is applied according to the accounting rules in depreciation,
the value of V f (ak , x) decreases linearly each year and after five years, in typical ISP

network equipment accounting standards, it converges to 0 or an arbitrary remaining value.
After the purchase of the asset, the fixed asset value of a k in x year can be expressed by the
following formula (2).
V f (ak , x) = −

(V f (ak ,0) − V fr )

x + V f (ak ,0) (2)
( x + n)
Where, x : No. of passed year after purchase, x > 0 integer
n : Remaining years
x + n : Typically 5 years for ISP
V f (ak ,0) : Asset value at purchasing point

V fr : Remaining asset value
Through the individual assets on network a k , m unit of services can be offered, and if the
service value created by a k through the distribution of a particular service is V psw (ak , x) , the
entire service value created through a k can be shown as the following formula (3).
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m

Vs (ak , x) = ∑ V pswk (ak , x)

(3)

k =1

If the service value of the particular asset and fixed asset value has a relationship of
Vs > 10Vt , Vt ≅ Vs is approximated since the service value is a major element in entire asset
value. However, calculating the aforementioned V psw (ak , x) in formula (3) is considerably
difficult in an actual network. The reason is that the degree of contribution of an asset to
generating individual service changes from time to time and it is nearly impossible to
separate the particular service-related traffic amongst other traffic processed by each asset.
Therefore, the asset loss modeling technique, suggested by Ho Kun Moon [7], uses a method
that deduces each service value Vs (ak , x) of an asset generated annually. To achieve this, it
incorporates the characteristics of the network that is a systematic combination of each asset
and uses a reverse calculation approach to estimate the service value from individual asset
components involved for the specific service, based on the revenue generated by the assets.
Such approach is possible because the network has attributes, and: (1) All service users have
to use the assets to access the network; and (2) the value of a high network layer service is
larger or equal to than that of a low network layer service due to the layered structure of a
network. Moreover, if the redundant design is not done, it can be assumed that the
contributions of the network assets on the same network layer to a particular service are
almost evenly proportioned to a year. Under this assumption, if the method to estimate the
service value Vs (ak , x) of individual assets in a given year is simply expressed, the value can
be obtained as shown in (Table 1).
(Table 1) Calculation for Total Asset value of Individual Asset
Step 1) Identify the number ( m ) of entire services offered at the network and each service
revenue ( Sv[t ] ).
Step 2) Check how many assets are contributing to generate each service revenues Sv[i ]
and identify the asset components N [ Sv(i )] for all m number of services.
m

Step 3) Calculate Vs (ak , x) = ∑ N [ Sv v ( i )] for all asset components n in the same network
S [i ]

i =1

layer. Apply same procedure for each network layer.
Step 4) Add Vs (ak , x) to the previously calculated V f (ak , x) to calculate Vt (ak , x) .

Step 5) Compare the asset value Vt (ak , x ) of each n components and obtain the priorities
prio(ak ) per asset, from the biggest asset value downwards.
Step 6) Repeat (Step 1) to (Step 6) for each network layer.
Using this method, when a particular asset is generating a number of service values, the
individual service value, generated in a year by a particular asset within the same layer, can
be deduced. Such calculation method can be commonly applied to all network layers. By
applying such method, when the network security risk is happened, the loss amount of
damaged individual assets can be deduced based on the total asset value. Also, in this
modeling technique, if the network uses multiple assets that have the same functions at a
particular location on the network for the service consistency, the effect from an equivalent
asset is additionally considered by the redundant design. For example, for server equipment
designed for load balancing and multiple numbers of routers where detour courses are
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provisioned for network troubles, the I-FCM (Improved Fuzzy Map) by Jong Pil Lee [9], who
improved the FCM (Fuzzy Cognitive Map) by Kosko [10], were used to deduce the asset loss
when a particular problem occurs on a specific asset. Different from the existing
methodologies, such an approach incorporated the objectivity in asset value estimation. The
proposed method [11] can calculate the relative importance of individual assets and the risk
dispersion effect due to the redundant design of network assets. The calculated asset value
implies the expected loss to the asset when risk occurs, and it can be expressed in a
quantitative risk level calculated through risk analysis. In the proposed system, the
quantitative risk level of assets is calculated in advance and stored at the asset management
DB. It conducts the risk analysis by connecting the asset information with particular system
information where risk has occurred or is expected to occur due to vulnerabilities and threats
detected and analyzed by the N-IDS and VAS on a real-time basis. The asset information
consists of the system name, operation system name, network IP, asset value information and
other management information.

3. Risk Analysis System Design
3.1 Design Considerations
In order to analyze the risk level of network assets on a real-time basis, it is essential to know
the current distribution status of vulnerabilities and threats on the network. Also, it must be
possible to effectively estimate how much risk can be created by specific threats. The
proposed system utilizes N-IDS and VAS to collect threat and vulnerability information on
the network. Also, it can be independently implemented on the system of a particular solution
vendor by using an outside DB. As a result, the asset-related policies in the N-IDS system
need not be set separately, so that the system can manage both the volume of typical harmful
packets that may cause network interruption and other harmful packets that can directly have
adverse effects on the network asset.
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(Fig. 2) Risk Analysis System Structure Diagram
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Previous studies [12, 13], have mainly focused on the improvement of detecting the patterns of
the individual threat originations. In cases where the offensive packets originate from an
address that has been spoofed, such an approach is not effective. Focused on the targeted
asset subjected to the threats, the objective of this study is to improve the interpretation
method of the correlation of attributes and time information from the detected information to
analyze what type of risk these threats can create on the relevant assets
3.2 System Structure and Functions
As shown in (Fig. 2), the proposed system is composed of a module ( ) that collects detected
information from the N-IDS and the VAS, a module ( ) that separates the N-IDS log into
server-related threats and network-related threats and analyzes each part, and an asset
management module ( ) DB that stores the expected loss values of individual assets. The
functions of each module are as follows:
3.2.1 Asset Management Module
Typically, an asset is defined as anything that has value to the organization. Various
classification standards and value assessment methods have been suggested. In this study,
using the asset loss modeling technique [11], asset value information is estimated with the
consideration of both physical value and intangible service value of systems that have
information distribution and transfer functions on the network. Previously estimated
individual asset value information is stored in the asset management DB with system
management information (Fig .3).
3.2.2 Log-collecting Module
The proposed system uses detected threat and vulnerability information supplied by
commercial N-IDS and VAS. In order to store each system log to an outside DB, it brings the
data via a SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) trap. Although various elements
can cause risks on a network, elements which are not detectable by N-IDS and VAS are not
considered.
Asset Mgt.

N-IDS

Sys. Name
Sys. O.S
Sys. IP
Service Value
Expected Loss
Sys. Admin.
Admin. Phone
E-Mail

Real Time
Intrusion
Detection

VAS
Sys. IP

Sys. Name
Sys. O.S
Sys. IP
Vul. Port
Vul. Protocol
Vul. Name
CVE-ID

Attack Time
Attack IP
Attack 포트
Target IP
Target Port
Attack Name
Attack Detection/
Termination Time
Protocol
Threat Level
CVE-ID
IP, CVE-ID
Vulnerability
Scanning

(Fig. 3) System DB Structure
The data needed for risk analysis from the collected log information of N-IDS and VAS is
selected, and each composes the previously defined DB as shown in (Fig. 3). At this point,
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for data correlation analysis between N-IDS and VAS, IP address and CVE-ID (Common
Vulnerability and Exposures-ID) can be used as a correlation key value
3.2.3 Log Analysis Module
Different from the approaches attempted in existing studies for N-IDS detection performance
improvement, the log analysis module uses and analyzes the method that separates the
server-related threat log and network-related threat log based on the attributes of the N-IDS
log. It can optimize the server-related threat log through correlation analysis with the VAS
log [14, 15]. The network-related threat log can show the risk development potentialities
through analyses in accordance to the frequency of the threat generated during a certain
period, based on attack targets and the forms of constantly generated threats.
3.3 Analysis Algorithm
This study suggests a method, which separates and analyzes N-IDS log information based on
attributes and an efficient information representation method
3.3.1 Server-related Threat Log Analysis
If the N-IDS log correlates with the VAS log, the threat information that may create risks can
be searched using the vulnerabilities of the server. Also, it could reduce the false positives
known as N-IDS problems and decreases the management burden dealing with the false
positives of the administrator.
(Fig. 4) shows the forms, which the N-IDS log correlates with particular vulnerabilities
detected by the VAS. However, the VAS DB has only the server software vulnerability
information as shown in (Fig. 5) so that it could only optimize the threat log in regard to
server vulnerabilities amongst the N-IDS log and requires a separate analysis technique for
other network-related threats.
N - ID S
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De s t . IP
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Attack Type
Attack Desc.
Attack Detect. Time
Alarm Level
Protocol
Threat Level
C VE - ID

VA S
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Vulnerability Effect
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(Fig. 4) Correlation Diagram of VAS Log and N-IDS Log
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(Fig. 5) Structure of VAS DB and N-IDS DB
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3.3.2 Network-related Threat Log Analysis
First, through the server-related threat log analysis, the remainder, excluded from the N-IDS
log correlated with the server vulnerabilities, is left as part of the network-related threat log.
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1
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Thrt Trgt n

Thrt times
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Thrt Type

Thrt Level

Thrt Level

Thrt Level

Asset Mngt.
Module

Risk
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Calc.

Alarm
Level
Decis
ion

Critical
Major
Minor
Warning

(Fig. 6) Conceptual Diagram of Network Related Threat Log
(Fig. 6) is a conceptual diagram of the network-related threat log analysis module. First,
generate a DB record per asset subjected to threat with the log collected in order from the
N-IDS and add on the frequency and types of threats developed during a time unit. At this
point, threat type information is managed in a form shown in (Fig. 7). Every time a new
threat to a particular asset occurs, add on to the same DB record in chronological order.

(Fig. 7) Managed information Type of Threat
3.3.3 Threat Level Calculation
The N-IDS has information that contains degrees of risk previously established according to
the attributes of detected individual threats [15]. Therefore, this study calculates the threat level
for assets, using the risk degree (T) information established in the N-IDS for the frequency of
threats to particular assets and individual threats.
n

Threat Level =

∑T
i =1

(4)

i

(n: Number of threats occurred, Ti : i th threat risk level)
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If the accumulated value of the estimated threat level during a unit time (previously
determined time window) reaches a certain point in formula (4), it indicates that a problem
may arise regarding the availability of the asset subjected to the threat.
3.3.4 Risk Level Estimation and Alert Level Decision
If the threats to particular assets exceed a certain level, the asset management module
supplies the sum of the expected loss of the threatened assets as the estimated value of the
risk level. However, determination of the alert level signaling according to the risk level from
the network operation point of view shall be decided after considering both the threat level
and risk level in formula (4). If a threat which may prevent the corresponding asset from
functioning normally exists, a prompt reaction is necessary depending on its severity even for
an asset with relative low risk level (asset value). Typically, the alert levels are classified into
four levels (Critical, Major, Minor and Warning), and a threshold value for dividing each
stage shall be established in advance by averaging the value of a threat level during a unit of
time.
Start

Attack to the remained
vulnerability of asset?
No

Calculate N

S: Average threat level of asset
per hour for the past time
N: Average threat level of asset
from now to past 5 minutes
V: The proportion of asset of
Total asset

Read S

Yes
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No

Compare(N,S)

Yes

Compare(N,S)
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Greater than
Equal

Greater than
Make Critical Alert

Make Alert
(Warning, Minor, Major)
Less than
Or Equal
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(Fig. 8) Flowchart for Alert level decision algorithm
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4. Test and Evaluation Results
4.1 Test Environment and Method
The proposed system is tested in the network having total 1006 servers with 7 kinds of
Operation Systems. For the test, we used commercial VAS and N-IDS system as shown
below. With VAS we have scanned system vulnerabilities in the network at every 3 days and
stored at DBMS. We also used N-IDS Log detected during 4 days at the same period.
Proposed Log Analysis Algorithm showed that total number of N-IDS Log can be reduced to
over 90% through classifying and integrating repeatedly detected N-IDS log according to its
attribute. And we showed system processing results in case of intrusion detection that may
cause serious impact for specific asset in the network.
z N-IDS : WinsTechnet Co. Sniper 3.0
z VAS : NileSoft Co. SecuGuard NSE 1.2
z DBMS : MS SQL 200
4.2 Test Result and Analysis
Table (1) shows the results from the vulnerability analysis of 1006 systems, using VAS. From
total of 32 systems, 15 vulnerabilities are detected.
Table (2) shows the reduction of the N-IDS log according to the proposed method. In this
case, all attacks generated for one day are divided per asset subjected to threats. The results
showed a more than 90% reduction rate, and this implies that many threats conduct repeated
attacks to particular assets.

(Table 1) Results from the VAS Inspection
Vulnerability for execution of telnet service
Vulnerability in telnet service information provision
Vulnerability in setting http server of Cisco router
Vulnerability in daytime
Vulnerability in opening of X server port
Vulnerability in ICMP timestamp request and others
Total

6
5
5
4
2
10
32

(Table 2) Results from the Reduction of Threat Alarm
N-IDS
Proposed
VAS-related
Time
Thrt. Alrm.
system
Thrt. Alrm
2004-01-20
1,037
30
1
2004-01-22
111
3
0
2004-01-23
122
4
0
2004-01-24
238
11
0

Changes
97.1
97.3
96.7
95.4

In relation to alert level signaling, the log analysis results were expressed in a form shown in
(Fig. 9) in order to deduce the threat development form to the corresponding asset from the
perspective of threat subjected asset and the potentiality of risk development.
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(Fig. 9) Alert information Print Screen Based on Assets
(Fig. 9) shows the information of an asset which is susceptible to critical severity. (Fig.10)
additionally gives detailed and timely arranged threat occurrence information when a specific
row showing critical severity is expanded by clicking leftmost plus sign.
If threat level exceeds threshold value, as illustrated in (Fig.10), asset information (expected
service loss value) given by asset management DB is automatically provided to the operator’s
console. The operator can quickly identify where the specific threat happens and can assume
whether the threat may cause risk or not.

(Fig. 10) Extended Threat information Print Screen

5. Conclusion and Future Research Directions
Although most systems implemented with risk analysis methodologies offer procedures and
methods that broadly consider the vulnerability of individual assets and threat elements from
the managerial, physical and technical perspectives, they are not able to offer a function
which estimates the risk level faced by the assets according to the changes being undergone
by threat elements from the Internet and the software vulnerability of assets on a real-time
basis. In order to solve these problems, this study proposes the design idea and experiment
results of the system, which effectively detects network- and server-related threats using
information supplied by commercial N-IDS and VAS that enables real-time based risk
analysis. Through the tests, when the existing N-IDS log information are separated into
server-related threats and network-related threats, and when they are correlated by the N-IDS
and VAS, the threat log can be reduced by more than 90%, compared to individually operated
cases. Moreover, by improving the threat detection capability and threat attribute analysis
function, the system was constructed to predict expected risk levels on a real-time basis when
certain points are reached. In order to increase accuracy on the risk analysis information, the
following studies are further required in the future: application of standard transporting data
format IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format), correlation analysis of
individual system logs for optimizing threat warnings and methods for establishing criteria
for categorizing threat warning levels.
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